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This essay argues that principles should play a limited role in policy making. It first illustrates 
the dilemma of timely action in the face of uncertain unintended consequences. It then introduces 
the precautionary and proactionary principles as different alignments of knowledge and action 
within the policymaking process. The essay next considers a cynical and a hopeful reading of the 
role of these principles in public policy debates. We argue that the two principles, despite initial 
appearances, are not all that different when it comes to formulating public policy. We also 
suggest that allowing principles to determine our actions undermines the sense of autonomy 
necessary for true action. 
 




Knowledge kills action. (Nietzsche)1 
 
1. Knowing and acting  
How are knowledge and action related? This question is asked less often than another: When do 
we know enough to justify taking action? In the context of making science and technology 
policy, the question assumes yet a different form: When do we have sufficient scientific risk 
assessment about a new technological activity to warrant promoting that activity and embedding 
it in society? In this paper, we explore how the relation between knowledge and action should be 
structured in policymaking, which itself is both a kind of knowing and acting.  
Decision makers often confront a dilemma: Act too soon, and we create avoidable harms; but act 
too late, and we forfeit possible benefits. Consider, for example, the case of hydraulic fracturing. 
In 1947, engineers working for the Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation conducted the first 
experimental trial of the “Hydrafrac” technique. They injected 1,000 gallons of gasoline 
thickened with naphthenic-acid-and-palm-oil (napalm) and a gel breaker to stimulate a gas well 
in the Hugoton gas field in Grant County, Kansas. The results were unimpressive. But they had 
reason to keep experimenting. Fracturing had been around since the 1860s, when nitroglycerin 
was used to stimulate hard rock wells in Pennsylvania. Though extremely dangerous, the 
technique had great success in “shooting” wells, or breaking-up oil-bearing formations to 
increase initial flow and ultimate recovery.  
                                                          
1 Nietzsche (1967 [1872]), p. 60. 
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In the 1930s, engineers experimented with non-explosive liquid acids in attempts to “pressure 
part” formations. Floyd Farris of Stanolind used these trials to establish a relationship between 
observed well performance and various treatments. This pioneering scientific study created a 
better understanding of the phenomena and led to the idea of hydraulic fracturing or Hydrafrac. 
Further experiments were conducted, with Haliburton Oil Well Cementing Company owning an 
exclusive license to pump the new Hydrafrac process. In 1949, 332 wells were treated with far 
better results: the average production increased 75%.  
By 2010, 2.5 million hydraulic fracturing treatments had been performed worldwide. The 
technique, modified and greatly intensified over the years, not only boosts well productivity but 
also has been credited with adding 9 billion barrels of oil and more than 700 Trillion standard 
cubic feet of gas to US reserves since 1949. Without this technique, those reserves would have 
remained uneconomical to develop (Montgomery and Smith 2010).  
The scientists and engineers of the 1940s had reason to believe that high-pressure fluid injections 
could result in the desired outcome of increased flow. There had been earlier results that looked 
promising. They were not acting in the dark. Yet neither did they know for certain which 
technique would perform best. There was some level of knowledge that made the risk of further 
experimentation seem worthwhile. Nonetheless it remained risky. It could have been a bust.  
But this picture is not the whole story, because the knowledge discussed so far pertains only to 
the intended outcome of increasing well productivity. This picture confines the story to the 
corporate players and reduces the question to one about their bottom-line: is further 
experimentation a good risk to take in terms of maximizing profit? The unintended effects not 
directly related to the goal of productivity are left out. For example, what are the risks posed by 
various chemicals and techniques to groundwater? What will happen to the millions of gallons of 
chemicals that flow back up the well? Where will all the necessary water come from? What 
about the impacts of related truck traffic and air emissions? Is the enhanced production and 
consumption of fossil fuels a good thing?  
How much knowledge do we require about unintended consequences prior to taking action? 
Your answer to that question is likely to depend how you are situated relative to intended and 
unintended consequences. Some interests are better served by acting sooner rather than later. The 
corporations reap the benefits of increased productivity and do not bear the full burden of 
environmental contamination. Other interests are better served by delaying action until more 
certainty can be had about possible harms. Some will advocate acting and fixing problems along 
the way, as is happening with hydraulic fracturing in Texas and Pennsylvania. Others will 
advocate anticipating and resolving problems prior to action, as is happening in New York with 
its moratorium on hydraulic fracturing while impact studies are performed.  
Decisions must be made, and public policy makers, at all levels of government, are struggling to 
balance the competing interests.2 Might they find useful guidance in some general principle of 
precaution or proaction?  
                                                          
2 Guston (2013) provides an excellent account of ‘anticipatory governance’ that points out that the question of 
governance – especially with regard to emerging technologies – cannot simply be reduced to government 
decisionmaking. We agree. 
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2. The precautionary and proactionary principles 
The precautionary and proactionary principles have both been advanced as useful tools for 
making such science and technology policies. Our goal is to explore the normative question of 
how we ought to think about these principles and their role in policy making. 
The policy process is a complex social dynamic (involving multiple actors, perspectives, and 
institutions) that determines who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell 1950). It is the process in 
which problems are defined and brought to government for solution and the institutional 
formulation, implementation, evaluation, and revision of alternatives (see Sabatier 1999; Clark 
2002).  
Our first goal is to understand how the proactionary and precautionary principles would have us 
structure relationships between knowledge and action in this process.   
The precautionary and proactionary principles have been developed as ways to structure 
policymaking where there is (a) the possibility of harm and benefit resulting from a new 
technological activity, and (b) scientific uncertainty about the harms and benefits involved. They 
both pertain to the balancing of individual and corporate freedom (to pursue various intended 
desired outcomes) with the need for protections from the unintended adverse effects that the 
exercise of such liberties can produce. 
In such situations we can generally attempt to prevent or restrain the activity until cause-effect 
relations are better understood (precaution); or we can generally promote the activity while 
learning more about cause-effect relations along the way (proaction). We can conceive of the 
technology as guilty until proven innocent (precaution, where the burden of proof lies with 
proponents of the activity) or as innocent until proven guilty (proaction, where the burden of 
proof lies with opponents of the activity). Precautionary politics tend to invoke scientific 
uncertainty to curb technological innovation (for example, New York’s policy position that not 
enough is known about the impacts of fracking to justify its promotion). Proactionary politics 
tend to encourage innovation as a way to test hypotheses (for example, we can improve drilling 
and production as we learn from practice).  
But is this approach the best way to think of these principles, and do they really offer anything 
valuable to the policy process (cf. Stirling 2007; Luján and Todt 2012)?  
The precautionary principle has not only been the subject of a great deal of academic discussion 
(see for instance Foster et al. 2000; Sunstein 2005; Stirling 2007; Luján and Todt 2012), but it 
has also been written into official science policies (European Commission 2000, Annex II). In 
contrast, the proactionary principle has attracted little academic attention outside of advocates of 
transhumanism (Fuller 2012a and 2012b are exceptions) and is not cited in any official policy.  
In what follows, we first situate the discussion within a wider debate about the place of science 
in public policy. We then outline the precautionary and proactionary principles, noting how they 
relate to the policy process and the role of science therein. Next, we discuss how we ought to 
think about the precautionary and proactionary principles in relation to science and technology 
policy making. Finally, we conclude with a set of recommendations about the use of such 
principles in policy making. 
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3. The place of science in public policy 
Modern science had long been seen as a source of truth that can secure universal consent and 
legitimate a common authority in pluralist societies (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Science was 
thought to produce impartial and neutral knowledge that establishes facts outside of any 
particular point of view (see Lacey 2005; Douglas 2009).  Insulated from “external” values, 
science, by virtue of its special epistemic authority, would garner the legitimacy to compel 
political action (see Sarewitz 1996; Pielke and Byerly 1998; Guston 2000). In line with this 
value-free ideal, decisions in complex societies rightly flow from the top down as scientific 
experts isolate problems and apply tools to solve them (Collins and Evans 2002). Indeed, the 
very term ‘policy’ seems to denote this rationalistic approach to problems as distinct from the 
irrational bargaining and power of ‘politics’ (Cf. Pielke 2002).  
But the notion that the universal method of science delivers certainty, dissolves disputes, and 
compels action began to unravel in the latter part of the 20th century (see Ezrahi 1990; Pielke 
2007; Brown 2009; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Indeed, science often prolongs and exacerbates 
political controversies rather than resolving them (Sarewitz 1996; Sarewitz 2004). The value-free 
ideal is unable to explain persistent disagreements about such issues as climate change, 
biotechnology, and nuclear waste storage. One way to attempt to salvage the ideal is to posit that 
the science is ignored or misunderstood. Yet these explanations do not account for the fact that 
“the science” is often itself uncertain and contentious (Elliott 2011).  
One common way to summarize the contemporary science-technology-policy nexus is in terms 
of “post-normal science,” characterized by “uncertainty, value loading, and a plurality of 
legitimate perspectives” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 2003). The conclusion that science does not 
automatically resolve political disputes and may in fact itself be ‘politicized’ has prompted 
Science, Technology, and Society (STS) scholars to conceive alternative science policy 
relationships. Two efforts are most significant: (1) those that, focusing on policy for science, 
seek to reform knowledge production; and (2) those that, focusing on science for policy, seek to 
reform the roles of “experts” and “lay citizens” in science and technology policies.3  
First, among those focusing on policy for science, several scholars seek to reconcile the supply 
of scientific knowledge with its demand in policy (see Sarewitz and Pielke 2007). Another 
important example is the idea of “Mode 2 knowledge production,” which outlines the need to 
replace investigator-initiated, discipline-based research with research that is problem-focused 
and interdisciplinary (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001). Research on interdisciplinarity 
and interactive expertise has also flourished under increasing societal demand that knowledge 
producers be held accountable for achieving real-world outcomes (Klein 1996; Frodeman et al. 
2010; Gorman 2010; Holbrook 2012a). Others are investigating how science funding agencies 
can and should respond to this accountability culture through the inclusion of broader societal 
impacts consideration in peer review processes (Bozeman and Boardman 2009; Frodeman and 
Briggle 2012; Holbrook 2009; 2012b; Holbrook and Frodeman 2011). 
                                                          
3 This is not to discount reflexive efforts to determine the proper role for philosophers and STS scholars in relation 
to issues of science and technology policy (Briggle, Frodeman, and Holbrook 2006; Fuller 2012a; Frodeman, 
Briggle, and Holbrook 2012; Jasanoff 2010). 
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A second response to “post-normal” science is to focus on the use of science for policy making. 
A good example is the promotion of citizen participation in policy contexts where science and 
technology intersect with public interests. Since science cannot eliminate the need for political 
decisions about values, invoking the value-free ideal itself becomes a political tactic where 
choices are framed as “neutral,” while in reality they embody certain values and perspectives 
(Haraway 1997; Fischer 2000; Latour and Porter 2004; Evans 2006; Fischer 2009). The 
fuzziness of the line between politics and science (or facts and values) means that liberal 
democracies premised on the ideal of “government by discussion” must find ways to enrich 
deliberation about, broaden participation in, and improve the intelligibility of science and 
technology policies (Winner 1986; Fischer 1990; Kass 2002; Turner 2003; Jasanoff 2007).  
At stake in the policy for science literature are moral and political questions about who to 
include, how to make decisions, how to refine and broaden the conceptual and normative 
language brought to bear in public deliberation, and how to define a “good” decision (Rittell and 
Webber 1973; Sclove 1995; Brown 2009). Some have blurred the line between “expert” and 
“public” by pointing out forms of “lay expertise” and “traditional knowledge” (Wynne 1996; 
Yearley 2000; Menzies 2006). Others have sought to justify and design more inclusive decision 
making arenas such as participatory, real-time, and constructive technology assessment (Rip, 
Misa, and Schot 1995; Guston and Sarewitz 2002; Sclove 2010), consensus conferences and 
citizen juries (Hamlett 2005), and policy advisory committees (Jasanoff 1990; Briggle 2009; 
Elliott 2011). Such “democratization” of scientific expertise raises questions about the legitimacy 
of deliberative governance (Lövbrand, Pielke, and Beck 2011). It also poses the “problem of 
extension” (Collins and Evans 2007): how far should the basis for technical decision making in 
the public domain be widened beyond certified experts? Is there a rationale for such expansion 
and what are its limits? What kinds of expertise exist and when should they be granted 
legitimacy in the public sphere?  
4. The precautionary principle in science policy 
If we have lost faith in science alone to provide uncontroversial answers to questions about what 
we should do, it is tempting to think of principles as bridging the gap between scientific 
knowledge and action. To see how principles might serve this function, we first examine the use 
of the precautionary principle in science policy. In its most general form, the precautionary 
principle suggests that we err on the side caution – that is, protect human or environmental health 
– when the consequences of particular actions are not sufficiently understood. Put differently, the 
precautionary principle (in all of its various formulations) suggests that, in situations of 
uncertainty about potential harms caused by a proposed action, we increase our knowledge 
before acting. 
Since others (for instance, Foster et al. 2000; Sunstein 2005; Stirling 2007; Luján and Todt 2012) 
have examined the precautionary principle on the level of theory, including multiple 
formulations of the principle and their varying policy implications, we will not do so here. Our 
aim is not to suggest that any particular interpretation of the precautionary principle is superior to 
any other. Indeed, an important implication of our argument is that focusing too much on the 
details of principles distracts us from the difficult task of decision making.4 Instead, we should 
                                                          
4 Cf. Guston (2013, p. 10): “Precaution, for example, prescribes a particular governing decision – take no risky 
action – under given circumstances of uncertainty and qualities of risk. Not opposed to precaution as such, 
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pay more attention to the role of principles in general in decision making. At this point in our 
argument, we focus on how the use of the precautionary principle in science policy contexts fits 
into our analysis of the place of science in science policy.  
The precautionary principle has been explicitly incorporated into policy documents, especially in 
international environmental policy contexts, since the 1980s (European Commission 2000, 
Annex II).  Its inclusion in policy documents is a move that seems to fit squarely in the policy for 
science category: it subjugates scientific and technological development to the demand that it 
demonstrate a proposed development is safe, or at least that the level of uncertainty about the 
harm involved is reduced to an acceptable level of risk. The idea behind the precautionary 
principle, then, is to introduce a higher value (precaution) as a governor on both scientific 
knowledge production and technological development.  
The application of the precautionary principle entails a distinction between the socio-political on 
the one hand and the scientific on the other, at least in the European context. The European 
Commission (2000, §7) puts the point this way: “The Commission wishes to reaffirm the crucial 
importance it attaches to the distinction between the decision to act or not to act, which is of an 
eminently political nature, and the measures resulting from recourse to the precautionary 
principle, which must comply with the general principles applicable to all risk management 
measures.” Whether to invoke the precautionary principle is a political decision; once the 
principle is invoked, other principles, especially ‘scientific’ principles that guide risk 
management, are brought into play.5 
However, it is not the case that this recognition of the political nature of the decision to invoke 
the precautionary principle implies a strict separation between politics and science. The political 
decision to invoke the precautionary principle is not made in isolation from scientific 
considerations. In fact, the decision to invoke the precautionary principle depends on both a prior 
identification of possible harm (a potential for the activity to lead to an undesirable outcome) and 
a level of scientific uncertainty concerning the probability of that harm occurring. It is only if we 
both know that there may be harms and are uncertain about the extent of those harms that the 
precautionary principle is invoked.  
In terms of the policy process, the precautionary principle is involved in intelligence gathering 
and values advocacy, as its invocation is a political decision about how to handle risk and 
uncertainty. Its application then structures intelligence gathering, by calling for scientific 
evaluation to be “as complete as possible” and to identify “at each stage the degree of scientific 
uncertainty” (European Commission 2000, §4).  The anchoring decision (or prescription) aspect 
of the policy process (when a policy is actually made) hinges on whether the risks identified by 
the thorough scientific evaluation are acceptable or not.  
At this point in the policy process, in which rules are developed for specific cases, the 
precautionary principle takes on a diminished role. The development of specific rules is instead 
                                                          
anticipatory governance leaves that relationship between governing decision and quality of knowledge in productive 
tension.”  
5 Stirling (2007) argues convincingly that the precautionary principle is compatible with principles of risk 
assessment and risk management. 
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governed by an additional set of principles, including proportionality, non-discrimination, 
consistency, cost-benefit analysis, ongoing monitoring of scientific and technological 
developments, and the establishment of the burden of proof (European Commission 2000). These 
additional principles place limits on the application of the precautionary principle, so that the 
specific policies established, having been previously framed by the precautionary principle, also 
meet standards of fairness. Without these limits on the precautionary principle, it would be 
possible, for example, to single out a particular company and to prohibit it from developing a 
particular product until it proved the product safe even if another company were allowed to 
develop a similar product with similar risks without having to prove safety.  
The precautionary principle falls into the category of policy for science, since it imposes a 
general guiding value on knowledge production and use. It also falls into the category of science 
for policy, since it establishes science as the frame within which policy prescriptions are made. 
Policymaking is situated as a response to the risks identified by science (conducted prior to 
specific policy actions) – the political decision is whether those risks are acceptable or not. Thus, 
the precautionary principle is limited in its application both by particular ‘scientific’ values such 
as those associated with risk assessment and management, and in general by the principle of 
fairness in its implementation and translation into specific policies.  
Despite such limitations, some critics contend that the problem with the precautionary principle 
is neither that it is too prescriptive of particular rules nor that it is applied in discriminatory or 
inconsistent ways. Instead, they target their critique at the underlying value they believe the 
precautionary principle espouses: avoidance of risk. For this reason, they have developed an 
alternative, the proactionary principle, which entails what they see as the opposite value (risk 
taking).  
5. The proactionary principle 
The proactionary principle was explicitly designed as an alternative to the precautionary 
principle. It is in large part the brainchild of the futurist and transhumanist philosopher Max 
More, who attributes its origins to a 2004 conference of his Extropy Institute. More and the other 
‘proactionaries’ in attendance at the conference argued that rational risk-taking defines the 
human essence and that solving complex problems depends on encouraging (rather than 
restricting) technoscientific innovation. Most technological developments bring undesired effects 
along with the desired ones. The proactionary principle “allows for handling mixed effects 
through compensation and remediation instead of prohibition.” 
The proactionary principle may be best seen in light of the more general “principles of extropy,” 
which outline a belief that the best kind of society is one that promotes individual freedom to 
think rationally, act independently, and create ways to liberate humanity from the bonds of our 
“biological heritage, culture, and environment” (More 2003) The proactionary principle states: 
People’s freedom to innovate technologically is highly valuable, even critical, to 
humanity. This implies a range of responsibilities for those considering whether 
and how to develop, deploy, or restrict new technologies. Assess risks and 
opportunities using an objective, open, and comprehensive, yet simple decision 
process based on science rather than collective emotional reactions. Account for 
the costs of restrictions and lost opportunities as fully as direct effects. Favor 
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measures that are proportionate to the probability and magnitude of impacts, and 
that have the highest payoff relative to their costs. Give a high priority to people’s 
freedom to learn, innovate, and advance. (More 2005)  
More (2005) then offers his critique of the precautionary principle, which “biases decision 
making institutions toward the status quo, and reflects a reactive, excessively pessimistic view of 
technological progress.” By contrast, the proactionary principle would have decision makers 
“take into account all the consequences of an activity—good as well as bad—while apportioning 
precautionary measures to the real threats we face, in the context of an appreciation of the crucial 
role played by technological innovation and humanity’s evolving ability to adapt to and remedy 
any undesirable side-effects” (More 2005) 
According to More (2005), the precautionary principle prevents the introduction of new 
technologies that are essential to progress. More breaks this broad critique into six specific 
problems with the precautionary principle: it (a) assumes worst-case scenarios; (b) under-
estimates established threats to health, especially natural risks; (c) assumes the effects of 
regulation are positive or neutral, never negative; (d) ignores the potential benefits of technology; 
(e) illegitimately shifts the burden of proof on the proponent of an activity; and (f) conflicts with 
more balanced, common-law approaches to risk and harm. 
More (2005) concludes his remarks with a section on “the essence of the proactionary principle”  
Being proactive involves not only anticipating before acting, but learning by 
acting… Let a thousand flowers bloom! By all means, inspect the flowers for 
signs of infestation and weed as necessary. But don’t cut off the hands of those 
who spread the seeds of the future. 
The proactionary principle conceives of policy making as itself a kind of ongoing scientific 
experiment. It emphasizes the role of science in the later implementation, application, and 
appraisal stages where the ‘flowers’ that have already been planted by policy action are 
‘inspected.’ By contrast, the precautionary principle emphasizes science in the early, intelligence 
gathering, stages of policy making in a way that structures science more as something that 
precedes policy. To push the metaphor, the precautionary principle would have us inspect the 
seeds prior to sowing them—an activity that More sees as both obstructionist (because we will 
not get flowers) and hopeless (because we cannot predict outcomes without experimentation).  
We argue, however, that these differences are a matter of degree rather than of kind. More does 
not advocate taking action on the basis of total ignorance, so science plays some role prior to 
policy making for him. The question is how much knowledge to gather prior to action, not 
whether to gather knowledge at all.  
6. The limits of principles 
We see two ways of thinking about the precautionary and proactionary principles and their 
relation to policy. The first is cynical: the principles are of use in policy making only as masks 
for legitimating political decisions. The second is hopeful: the principles are useful platforms for 
articulating the fundamental values choices at stake in any given policy. The difference between 
the views hinges on the role such principles play in policy making (which we discuss in §7).  
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6.1 The Cynical Story 
The cynical story suggests that although they each seem to prescribe something rather specific, 
the precautionary and proactionary principles are actually masks. That is to say, they are parasitic 
upon prior values commitments embedded in a more fundamental conceptual scheme. This 
perspective means that one could make and justify polar opposite policy decisions by appeal to 
the same principle. Fuller (2012b, p. 164) writes, “In social psychological terms, precautionary 
policymakers set their regulatory focus on the prevention of worst outcomes, whereas 
proactionary policymakers seek the promotion of the best available opportunities.” (These 
options are what decision theorists call “maximin” and “maximax” strategies.6) But in the case of 
fracking, an environmentalist’s worst outcome is pollution, whereas for a venture capitalist it is 
diminished returns on investment. They could both be ‘precautionary’ in advocating contrasting 
policies. The same holds for ‘best available opportunities’: a healthy environment or a healthy 
bottom-line? One could be ‘proactionary’ either way.  
Cass Sunstein (2008) has similarly argued that the precautionary principle is “deeply 
incoherent.” Precautions also create risks, “hence the principle bans what it simultaneously 
requires.” As one example, Sunstein points to the “drug lag” that ensues when government takes 
a restrictive approach to new pharmaceuticals: “Stringent review protects people against 
inadequately tested drugs; but it will also prevent people from receiving the benefits of new 
medications. Is it ‘precautionary’ to require extensive testing, or to do the opposite?” 
This reading of principles has precedent in bioethics. In his 1973 essay, “Bioethics as a 
discipline,” Daniel Callahan argues that ideally this emerging discipline would provide a “good 
methodology” or decision procedure. This methodology would allow policy makers to reach 
“specific conclusions at specific times.” He notes that the only ethical methodologies capable of 
doing that are ones, like Roman Catholic scholasticism, that are essentially deductive. Given 
well-established first principles (presupposed cultural conditions and shared worldviews), one 
can deduce the right decision in any specific instance. Alas, as Callahan notes, in a pluralistic 
society we share no such common moral world.  
Callahan argues that bioethics must find “some commonly shared principles” that could function 
in a society composed of many worldviews the same way first principles function in Roman 
Catholicism. “Short of finding that,” he concludes, “I do not see how ethical methodologies can 
be developed which will include methods for reaching quick and viable solutions in specific 
cases.” And indeed much of the subsequent history of bioethics has been occupied with the 
development of such ‘universal’ principles. Principlism in bioethics maintains that moral 
controversies can be resolved and policies made through the application of the principles of 
respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice (see Beauchamp and Childress 
1979).  
Echoing the cyncial story about the precautionary and proactionary principles, K. Danner 
Clouser and Bernard Gert (1990) argue that bioethics principles can be at best a checklist of 
important things to remember. They cannot serve as decisions procedures, because each principle 
has a kind of relativism built into it. For example, ‘justice’ as a principle could denote any 
                                                          
6 Thanks to David Resnik for pointing this out at a presentation of an earlier version of this paper. 
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number of theoretical accounts of justice from Aristotle through Kant to Bentham, which rely on 
incommensurable premises. Consequently, people motivated by deeply divergent value systems 
could invoke the same principle (for example, justice) to justify contradicting policy options. 
Similarly, a transhumanists will see the use of performance enhancements as the epitome of 
human autonomy (e.g., Savalescu 2007), whereas a bioconservative will see them as a threat to 
autonomy (e.g., President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). ‘Autonomy’ means fundamentally 
different things to them – differences that are masked behind the principle.  
When included as part of the policy process, the principles can be used to justify decisions one 
has already made (or wants to make) on the basis of foundational values or particular interests 
that are never made explicit and discussed. The principles are there to provide the cover of a 
principled decision process, so it can appear that one’s desired outcome is the result of a fair, 
objective, and scientific assessment rather than a foregone conclusion. According to the cynical 
story, then, the principles are masks for politics as usual.7 
6.2 The Hopeful Story 
The hopeful story tells a markedly different tale, according to which the precautionary and 
proactionary principles serve as platforms for articulating and discussing the basic values 
orientations that remain hidden in the cynical story. According to the hopeful story, the 
principles can serve as starting points for discussing underlying values and coming to grips with 
the societal implications of advances in scientific knowledge and technology.8 We see such a 
conversation already beginning in the scholarly literature, despite the fact that – or perhaps 
because – the precautionary principle has received the lion’s share of scholarly attention.9  
Steve Fuller is currently the main scholarly interlocutor coming from a proactionary orientation. 
Fuller (2012b) addresses precaution and proaction as the ‘new ideological divide’ coming to 
dominate the 21st century (with the new right – or “down” – characterized as precautionary and 
the new left – or “up” – as proactionary). Fuller suggests that a proactionary ideology would 
unite libertarians and technocrats in support of a re-imagined welfare state that would both 
reward risk taking among its citizens and protect citizens from the negative consequences of their 
risk taking behaviors. Putting the state in charge of risk taking would protect citizens, according 
to Fuller, from the interests of corporations whose values are dominated by the maximization of 
profits rather than the free pursuit of the realization of human potential.  
Fuller’s call for the establishment of a reformed welfare state to promote the proactionary 
adventures of “moral entrepreneurs” (Fuller 2012c) may sound utopian at best; or one might 
dismiss Fuller as a Nietzschean madman calling for a social revolution to promote the 
development of a transhuman Übermensch. We think this provocation is part of his strategy as an 
intellectual. For Fuller, the intellectual is “more concerned with the whole truth than only the 
                                                          
7 Guston’s (2013) argument in favor of anticipatory governance addresses similar concerns in the context of 
nanotechnology. 
8 Cf. Guston (2013). 




truth” (Fuller 2005). Elsewhere, he writes, “The intellectual would prefer to utter falsehoods that 
are subsequently eliminated, attenuated or mitigated than utter truths that turn out to prevent the 
pursuit of further truths…. In short, overstatement invites participation from others …whereas 
understatement carries what Paul Grice used to call the ‘implicature’ that individuals should 
worry most of all about their own personal epistemic status” (Fuller 2012a, p. 4).  
Fuller’s advocacy of the proactionary principle, including his outrageous tone, is an effort to 
begin a critical discussion, to ‘invite participation’ from others, about the role of principles – 
specifically the precautionary principle – in policy making.  
Another recent attempt to provoke such a discussion that also moves beyond, while still 
incorporating, the precautionary principle is René von Schomberg’s (2013) account of 
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Although von Schomberg argues that lack of 
precautionary measures is a violation of RRI, he also pairs the precautionary principle with 
technology foresight in an effort to explore alternative paths to innovation: “Rather than a 
constraint, the precautionary principle can thus provide an incentive to open up alternative 
research and development trajectories” (2013, p. 19). The point of RRI is precisely to lay out a 
framework that “invites the participation of others” in the discussion of innovation: 
 
Definition: Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive 
process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to 
each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal 
desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products( in order to 
allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our 
society). (von Schomberg 2013, p. 19 – italics in original) 
 
Though von Schomberg’s tone is different, he seems to be aiming for something along the same 
lines as Fuller. Both feel the need to open up a conversation. Neither believes the precautionary 
principle alone is sufficient to determine policy prescriptions. Both believe that values that go 
beyond market values should be discussed.10 Both suggest that we need to have a forward-
looking bent to our deliberations about science and technology.11 If they do not agree on every 
detail, at least there is sufficient common ground – as well as sufficient difference of opinion – 
on which to base a discussion. Or so the hopeful story goes. 
 
7. On the use of the precautionary and proactionary principles for science policy 
The precautionary and proactionary principles are not fundamentally opposed. Rather, they map 
out vague destinations along a continuum (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                          
10 See Kleinman, Delborne, and Autry (2008) for a similar discussion of the need to move beyond the 
“precautionary trap” that commits its adherents to a scientific framing of their concerns. Like us, they argue that 
what is needed is a conversation that directly and explicitly confronts underlying values. See also Briggle 2013.  
11 See Davis and Laas (2013) for a discussion of RRI in comparison to the US National Science Foundation’s 





















Figure 1. The Proactionary-Precautionary Spectrum 
 
More suggests that the principles are polar opposites. But he is able to do so only by casting the 
precautionary principle in extreme terms. His reading of precaution makes it sound as though it 
is a recipe for squelching any and every innovation. To follow it consistently would trap us in the 
Stone Age. One could make a similarly extreme caricature of the proactionary principle as a 
recipe for a wanton, reckless, and cavalier free-for-all. To follow it consistently would be to 
license a total disregard for any risks.  
 
But these extremes are caricatures. Indeed, the two principles have rather striking similarities. 
Most importantly, both acknowledge the significance of freedom to engage in and protection 
from the pitfalls of risk taking. They both acknowledge the importance of evaluating risks at 
least to some extent prior to taking action. No one, not even the most staunch proactionary, is 
seriously advocating widespread deployment of totally unknown chemicals without any prior 
knowledge of their properties. Similarly, no one is seriously calling for the cessation of all 
industrial activity.  
 
More frames his idea as an “alternative” to the precautionary principle. But he is still speaking 
from within the same framework of risk evaluation and management. He just demands that such 
processes also consider the risks of regulating technologies rather than only the risks of not 
regulating them, a claim that many advocates of the precautionary principle also endorse.12 He 
acknowledges the need for restrictive measures when the “potential impact of an activity has 
both significant probability and severity.” This leaves plenty of interpretive room for one to 
apply restrictions.  
 
The significant middle ground shared by the two principles means that they could be used to 
arrive at very similar policy prescriptions. The principles are not simple decision procedures, 
which, if followed, would eliminate the need for interpretation and judgment in specific policy 
scenarios. This argument means, in turn, that the principles are far from sufficient for making 
policy. Polarizing characterizations of competing interests under the labels ‘precautionaries’ and 
‘proactionaries’ only makes the policy process more difficult. 
 
                                                          
12 Cf. von Schomberg’s (2012) discussion of the role of the precautionary principle with regard to ‘soft’ regulation 
in the case of nanotechnology: “Rather than stifling research and innovation, the precautionary principle acts within 
the [European] Code of Conduct as a focus for action, in that it calls for funding for the development of risk 
methodologies, the execution of risk research, and the active identification of knowledge gaps” (p. 155). See also 
Resnik (2012).  
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Fuller, like More, portrays ‘precautionaries’ as risk-averse. Invoking the argument between 
William James and William Kingdon Clifford about the ethics of belief (James 2009 [1896]), 
Fuller (2012a) links ‘proactionaries’ to James and ‘precautionaries’ to Clifford: 
For the Jamesian voluntary believer, epistemology is about leveraging what we 
know now into a future we would like to see. For the Cliffordian ethical believer, 
epistemology is about shoring up what we know so that it remains secure as we 
move into an uncertain future. The former seeks risks and hence errs on the side 
of overestimating our knowledge, while the latter avoids risk and hence errs on 
the side of underestimating our knowledge.  
However, as we argue above, the precautionary principle does not entail an avoidance of risk. On 
the contrary, the precautionary principle actually seeks risk, insofar as it requires the reduction of 
uncertainty (unknown unknowns) to risk (known unknowns). Whereas the dispute between 
James and Clifford turns on the epistemic risk of uncertainty, the dispute between 
‘proactionaries’ and ‘precautionaries’ turns on the questions of how we reduce uncertainty to 
risk, who is responsible for doing so, and when we need to do so relative to taking action. In 
other words, it is a discussion of the appropriate burden of risk (rather than burden of proof). 
In fact, both ‘proactionaries’ and ‘precautionaries’ agree that reduction of uncertainty to risk 
ought to be based on science. But who should pay for the studies? Must the studies be conducted 
before the potentially harmful activity takes place? How many studies or how much evidence 
will be sufficient? Who should be held responsible, assuming harms actually result from the 
activity? We suggest that these are questions that ought to be answered on a case-by-case basis, 
with the joint participation of those in favor of and opposed to the action in a discussion of the 
burden of risk. Rather than invoking principles as a justification for our tendencies either to 
overestimate or underestimate our knowledge, in each case we should weigh the risks of both 
action and inaction and pursue the course of action we judge to be most likely to mitigate the 
harms of both.  
To put the point in more general terms, principles should not be treated as decision procedures. 
For those who treat principles as decision procedures, values are predetermined, intelligence is 
gathered, and the results are fed into the principles, which spit out prescriptions. But in fact, 
principles are not sufficient in and of themselves to generate specific rules. The formulation of 
such rules always requires judgments, which may be oriented, but not fully determined, by the 
principles. Principles should be used to make such judgments explicit and participatory rather 
than used as masks to hide judgments.   
We take our view regarding the proper use of principles in policy making as consistent with 
Lindblom’s (1959) notion of ‘muddling through’ the policy process. Treating principles as 
decision procedures is another species of the ‘rational comprehensive’ approach to policy 
making. Our point is also the flipside of the coin Sheila Jasanoff (2007) discusses in terms of 
‘technologies of humility’. Whereas Jasanoff urges policy makers to know when to say ‘when’ to 
calls for further research, we are urging philosophers and science policy analysts to know when 
to say ‘when’ to calls for ‘principled’ decision making. 
 
8. Knowing and acting 
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We open this paper with a quote from Nietzsche: knowledge kills action. Yet, throughout the 
paper, we have sought to answer the question of how much knowledge we should have before 
acting. We return now to the more fundamental question: How are knowledge and action 
related? Nietzsche’s claim – knowledge kills action – seems to offer an easy answer: acting 
requires that we lack knowledge. Using Schopenhauerian terms, Nietzsche continues: “action 
requires the veils of illusion” (1967 [1872], p. 60).  
To put the point in our own terms: acting requires autonomy. To say that acting requires 
autonomy means that acting requires that we own our actions. We own our actions by giving 
ourselves the principle(s) according to which we ought to act. If anything else determines our 
actions for us, we are in a condition of heteronomy. This is why principles should not be treated 
as decision procedures. Acting on the basis of predetermined principles is not really acting – that 
is, acting on the basis of predetermined principles rules out the possibility of giving ourselves the 
principles according to which we act (since they are already given to us).  
If we know in advance of acting exactly what we ought to do, we are determined by that 
knowledge, and therefore we are not autonomous. Autonomy – acting on our own – requires that 
we not know ahead of time how we ought to act. Knowledge kills action in the sense that 
reducing principles to decision procedures kills autonomy. For this reason, rather than 
predetermining policy, principles should only serve the limited role of starting points for 
discussion of particular actions. 
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